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PROFESSIONAL DISCIPLINE: UNFAIRNESS
AND INEFFICIENCY IN THE
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS
MICHAEL R. LANZARONE*
INTRODUCTION
S TATE government, in its capacity both as an employer and a
licensing authority, exercises substantial authority over profession-
als. It has the authority to revoke professional licenses' and to fire
professional employees. 2 Because either action can effectively destroy
a professional's career, the law demands that state governments exer-
cise this power fairly. 3 To protect the public against the unethical and
* Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law; A.B. 1958, Fordham
College; J.D. 1961, Fordham University; L.L.M. 1973, New York University.
1. E.g., Alaska Stat. § 08.36.315 (1982); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 12-38-217 (1978);
La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 37:1285 (West Supp. 1983); R.I. Gen. Laws § 5-34-24 (Supp.
1982).
2. E.g., Minn. Stat. Ann. § 125.12 subd. 6 (West 1979); R.I. Gen. Laws § 16-
13-4 (1981); W. Va. Code § 18A-2-8 (1977); Wyo. Stat. § 21-7-110 (1977). The non-
tenured public employee, unlike his counterpart in the private sector, may not be
fired for exercising first amendment rights. Mount Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of
Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 283-84 (1977); Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593,
597-98 (1972); Daulton v. Affeldt, 678 F.2d 487, 490-91 (4th Cir. 1982). The federal
civil rights act makes it illegal to fire such a worker because of his race or religion. 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1976). If the public employer's action does not infringe any
constitutional or statutory mandate, however, it may terminate the employment of
the non-tenured employee for an arbitrary reason or for no reason at all. See Jeffries
v. Turkey Run Consol. School Dist., 492 F.2d 1, 4-5 (7th Cir. 1974). For a list of
statutes protecting employees against discharge, see Estreicher, At-Will Employment
and the Problem of Unjust Dismissal: The Appropriate Judicial Response, 54 N.Y. St.
B.J. 146, 146-47 (1982). In some states the ability of non-tenured employees to obtain
additional job security is severely limited. See, e.g., Brown v. Board of School
Trustees, 398 N.E.2d 1359, 1361 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980).
3. It has long been recognized that a professional license is a valuable property
right, which may be revoked only with due process of law. Millett v. Hoisting Engrs
Licensing Div., 119 R.I. 285, 295, 377 A.2d 229, 235 (1977); see Hecht v. Monaghan,
307 N.Y. 461, 467-68, 121 N.E.2d 421, 423-24 (1954). The applicability of the due
process clause to the initial application for a license has also been recognized.
Hornsby v. Allen, 326 F.2d 605, 608 (5th Cir. 1964); see K. Davis, Administrative
Law Text § 7.13, at 184-86 (3d ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as K. Davis I]. It has also
been held that a tenured employee may not be discharged without due process of
law. Slochower v. Board of Higher Educ., 350 U.S. 551, 555, 559 (1956); Gosney v.
Sonora Indep. School Dist., 603 F.2d 522, 525 (5th Cir. 1979).
Perhaps the most important aspect of due process is the requirement of an impar-
tial tribunal. See K. Davis I, supra, §§ 12.01-.06, at 245-53; B. Schwartz, Constitu-
tional Law § 7.9, at 251-53 (1979). This requirement of impartiality necessitates the
disqualification of the trier of fact in numerous situations. For example, if the
tribunal has a financial interest in the outcome of the proceedings, the requisite
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incompetent individual, however, states must also act swiftly in cases
of alleged wrongdoing and incompetence. Unfortunately, the discipli-
nary procedures that have evolved for addressing professional wrong-
doing and incompetence are often neither fair nor efficient. 4
Disciplinary proceedings often occur in an administrative setting in
which the ultimate trier of fact has been involved in the preliminary
investigation and prosecution. 5 Such procedures threaten the goal of
impartiality by increasing the possibility that the fact finder will have
prejudged critical issues. Although the Supreme Court has held such
procedures constitutional," the question remains whether they are
sufficiently fair.
A number of states, recognizing the potential risk of prejudgment,
have enacted statutes that separate the investigative, prosecutorial
and adjudicative functions. 7 Often, however, these statutes guarantee
impartiality will not exist. In Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927), a criminal case,
the Supreme Court found a denial of due process when the trier of fact retained for
his own compensation the court costs assessed against those who were convicted, but
received no monies from those who were acquitted. This direct pecuniary stake in the
outcome constituted a denial of due process. Id. at 523.
The Court extended the Tumey decision in Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409
U.S. 57 (1972). In Ward, the mayor was the trier of fact. Although he had no direct
financial stake in the outcome, the Court found the requisite "possible temptation"
because "the mayor's executive responsibilities for village finances may make him
partisan to maintain the high level of contribution from the mayor's court." Id. at 60.
Another potential reason for disqualification of the trier of fact is if he harbors
personal bias or prejudice against one of the parties. Saunders v. Piggly Wiggly
Corp., 1 F.2d 582, 584 (W.D. Tenn. 1924); K. Davis I, supra, §§ 12.01-.06, at 245-
53; B. Schwartz, supra, § 7.9, at 253.
4. This Article discusses general state license revocation statutes, which typi-
cally cover professionals such as physicians, physiotherapists, nurses, chiropractors,
dentists, dental hygienists, veterinarians, pharmacists, podiatrists, optometrists, opti-
cians, engineers, architects, landscape architects, public accountants, certified short-
hand reporters, psychologists, certified social workers and licensed masseurs. Public
school teaching is the principal profession for which such statutes (applicable only to
professionals) have been enacted to protect government employees against unjust
dismissal. See sources cited supra note 2. This Article does not purport to deal with
special license revocation procedures that in a given state may be applicable to a
single profession such as law. E.g., Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 6100-6118 (West 1974
& Supp. 1982); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 4705.02 (Page 1977); Schneyer, The Model
Rules and Problems of Code Interpretation and Enforcement, 1980 Am. B. Found.
Research J. 939, 944-47; Williams, Professionalism and the Corporate Bar, 36 Bus.
Law. 159, 162-64 (1980). Nor does it cover general civil service laws that are
primarily concerned with job security for non-professionals. E.g., 5 U.S.C. §§ 7501-
7543 (1976 & Supp. V 1981); Cal. Gov't Code §§ 19,570-19,588 (West 1980 & Supp.
1982) (as amended by Act of Sept. 13, 1982, ch. 985, § 2.5, 1982 Cal. Legis. Serv.
5199 (West), and by Act of Sept. 2, 1982, ch. 696, § 2, 1982 Cal. Legis. Serv. 4041
(West), and by Act of Sept. 10, 1982, ch. 916, §§ 1-2, 1982 Cal. Legis. Serv. 4930-31
(West)).
5. See infra note 16 and accompanying text.
6. Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 55 (1975).
7. See infra notes 61-76, 112-25 and accompanying text.
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fairness at the expense of judicial and administrative efficiency." They
make disciplinary procedures so cumbersome and costly that licensing
and disciplinary boards may be deterred from taking action in appro-
priate cases. This Article examines the problem of prejudgment in
professional disciplinary procedures and discusses alternatives that
enhance fairness without sacrificing efficiency.
I. PREJUDGMENT IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE SETTING
In order for a professional to practice his profession, he must obtain
a license from the state.9 Once licensed, he is subject to various forms
of disciplinary action-including license revocation-should he en-
gage in prohibited conduct.' 0 Similarly, a professional employed by
the government may be subject to disciplinary action, including dis-
missal." State statutes or rules often delineate the actions for which a
licensed professional or government employee may be disciplined. 12
Typically these actions include unprofessional conduct and incompe-
tence, 13 but may also include criminal conduct unrelated to profes-
sional ability.' 4
Professional discipline statutes usually provide that disciplinary pro-
ceedings against a professional may be commenced when there are
reasonable grounds to believe that the professional has committed
certain statutory violations.' 5 In many cases, the same board and
possibly the same individuals who make the initial determination of
reasonable cause also ultimately decide whether the professional in
fact engaged in improper conduct.' 6 In deciding that "reasonable
8. See infra notes 61-76 and accompanying text.
9. See, e.g., Alaska Stat. § 08.64.170 (1982) (doctors); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 12-25-
101 (Supp. 1982) (engineers); Ky. Rev. Stat. § 315.030 (1983) (pharmacists); Wash.
Rev. Code Ann. § 18.32.090 (Supp. 1982) (dentists).
10. See, e.g., Ky. Rev. Stat. § 314.091 (1983); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. §
18.04.300 (1978). See sources cited supra note 1.
11. See, e.g., N.J. Stat. Ann. § 18A:6-10 (West 1968); Wis. Stat. Ann. §
118.23(3) (West 1973). See supra note 2.
12. Among the more detailed statutes are those in Alaska, Alaska Stat. §
08.36.315 (1982), and Louisiana, La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 37:1285 (West Supp. 1983).
13. See, e.g., Colo. Rev. Stat. § 12-4-111 (Supp. 1982) (architects); Ky. Rev.
Stat. § 314.091 (1983) (nurses); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 18.04.300 (1978) (account-
ants).
14. E.g., Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 4238 (West 1974) (conviction of drug-related
crime); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 231.28(1)(e) (West Supp. 1983) (conviction of any criminal
charge); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 28A:70.160 (Supp. 1982) (conviction of any
crime).
15. See, e.g., Colo. Rev. Stat. § 12-38-218(2) (1978); R.I. Gen. Laws § 5-34-25
(Supp. 1982).
16. See, e.g., Colo. Rev. Stat. § 12-2-126 (1978) (accountants); Idaho Code § 54-
2105(5)(b), (d) (Supp. 1982) (veterinarians); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 65-1120(b) (1980) (as
amended by ch. 245, 1981 Kan. Sess. Laws 1020) (nurses); Md. Ann. Code art. 751/,
§ 17(b)-(e) (1980) (engineers); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 18.04.320 (1978) (account-
[Vol. 51
1983] PROFESSIONAL DISCIPLINE 821
grounds" exist, a disciplinary board is already making a determination
against the employee or licensee. In a close case, such a determination
can be quite damaging because the decision-makers may be unable to
distinguish between reasonable grounds and actual guilt. Thus, the
ants); Wis. Stat. Ann. §§ 442.12, 447.07 (West 1974 & Supp. 1982-1983) (account-
ants and dentists).
The Colorado statutes with respect to nurses illustrate the problem. These statutes
provide that a disciplinary proceeding "may be commenced when the board has
reasonable grounds to believe" that the licensee has committed acts in violation of the
licensing statute. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 12-38-218(2) (1978). The statute empowers the
same board that decided that such grounds exist to conduct the disciplinary hearing.
Id. § 12-38-218(4). The Rhode Island nurses statute provides that on the filing of a
complaint, two or more members of the board "shall immediately investigate such
charges." R.I. Gen. Laws § 5-34-25 (Supp. 1982). If the entire board concludes that
the investigation reveals reasonable grounds for believing the licensee is guilty, it
conducts a hearing to determine guilt or innocence. Id.
The Ohio legislature has established state boards to regulate many of the profes-
sions licensed by the state. Typically, the board is empowered to suspend or revoke
the professional's license for cause. See, e.g., Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 4703.15 (Page
1977) (architects); id. § 4725.11 (optometrists). The licensing statutes themselves
contain no provisions to prevent the boards from conducting the initial investigation
into the licensee's conduct. The entire process, however, is subject to the Ohio
Administrative Procedure Act. Ohio Rev. Code §§ 119.01-.13 (Page 1978 & Supp.
1982). That statute permits, but does not require, the board to appoint a hearing
officer, for license revocation hearings. Additionally, there is no provision to prevent
the examining board from conducting the initial investigation. While the board's
final decision is appealable, id. § 119.12 (Page Supp. 1982), the Ohio APA requires a
court to affirm the agency decision "if it finds, upon consideration of the entire
record and such additional evidence as the court has admitted, that the order is
supported by reliable, probative, and substantial evidence." Id. The ability of the
court to receive additional evidence undoubtedly provides the licensee with some
additional protection.
The structure of the disciplinary process for the professional employee is also
seriously flawed. Tenure legislation, which seeks to protect the employee against
arbitrary dismissal, often fails to guarantee a truly neutral decision-maker who has
not prejudged the issue. The Alabama statute illustrates the problem. An Alabama
teacher may be dismissed by a majority vote of the employing board. Ala. Code § 16-
24-9 (1977). The teacher may appeal such an action to the state tenure commission,
which must sustain the board's action unless it was "arbitrarily unjust" or not in
compliance with the statute. Id. § 16-24-10(a)-(b) (as amended by Act No. 81-686, §
2, 1981 Ala. Acts 1157). The commission's action is subject to judicial review, but is
"final and conclusive" if it is in compliance with the statute and is not "unjust." Id. §
16-24-38 (1975). This standard of judicial review is quite narrow. See Alabama State
Tenure Comm'n v. Mountain Brook Bd. of Educ., 343 So. 2d 522, 524-25 (Ala.
1976).
While the Alabama statute provides numerous procedural protections, it does not
ensure fairness. The employing board commences the disciplinary process by notify-
ing the teacher of the reasons for the proposed cancellation of his contract. Ala. Code
§ 16-24-9 (1977). Presumably, this is done after some discussion of the facts. Thus,
the ultimate trier of fact receives ex parte knowledge of the alleged facts, makes a
decision to initiate charges and then sits as a jury. Moreover, it often must decide
whether to believe the accused teacher or one or more supervisory personnel whom it
has hired and with whom it has a more direct and closer relationship. The possibility
of unfairness is manifest, and a narrow standard of review exacerbates the problem.
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danger of unfairness to the accused is severe. In addition to this
potential for unfairness, the practice creates the suspicion that final
decisions are "rationalizations of the preliminary findings which the
[board], in the role of prosecutor, presented to itself."' 17 From the
vantage point of the profession being regulated or the individual being
charged, there is at the very least an appearance of prejudgment.
Even assuming that the trier of fact can separate a determination of
reasonable grounds from an ultimate decision on the merits, other
dangers inhere in a procedure that combines prosecutorial and adjudi-
catory functions. The basis for the reasonable grounds determination
may be prejudicial evidence or, at the very least, material that is never
introduced at the later contested hearing. This raises the possibility
that as a result of ex parte contacts with staff investigators or others
the ultimate deciders of fact will be influenced by evidence that the
accused is unable to refute during the hearing on the merits because he
is unaware it has been communicated. Federal government studies
prior to the passage of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA or
Act)18 noted the difficulties inherent in combining prosecutorial and
adjudicatory functions. These studies concluded that such a practice
"undermines judicial fairness" 19 and is "plainly undesirable. 20
Determinations of employers and licensing boards are of course
reviewable in court. Although the standard of review varies, 2' most
statutes require affirmance if the board's factual findings are sup-
17. President's Comm. on Admin. Management, Report on Administrative Man-
agement in the Government of the United States 36-37 [hereinafter cited as Report on
Administrative Management], reprinted in Reorganization of the Executive Dep'ts,
Message from the President of the United States Transmitting a Report on Reorgani-
zation of the Executive Departments of the Government, S. Doc. No. 8, 75th Cong.,
1st Sess. 68 (1937).
18. Ch. 324, 60 Stat. 237 (1946), repealed and superseded by Government
Organization and Employees Act, Pub. L. No. 89-554, 80 Stat. 378 (1966) (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.). The relevant sections of the federal
APA are cited infra pt. III(B).
19. Report on Administrative Management, supra note 17, at 68.
20. Committee on Admin. Proc. in Gov't Agencies (Appointed by the Attorney
General at the Request of the President, to Investigate the Need for Procedural
Reform in Various Administrative Tribunals and to Suggest Improvements Therein),
Report on Administrative Procedures, S. Doc. No. 8, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 56 (1941).
21. Kentucky limits the court's review to whether: "(a) The board acted without
or in excess of its power; (b) The order appealed from was procured by fraud or
misconduct; (c) Substantial evidence supports the order appealed from; (d) The
board's decision is supported by the law." Ky. Rev. Stat. § 325.360(10) (1983) (public
accountants). Some states also permit the court to determine if the proceedings were
unconstitutional or so "arbitrary or capricious" that the board exceeded its authority.
E.g., Colo. Rev. Stat. § 12-23-120 (1978) (electricians); Wash. Rev. Code §
18.32.750 (1978) (dentists). Rhode Island succinctly provides that "[a]ny person...
may appeal [from the board's decision] to the proper court under normal civil
procedures for a review thereof." R.I. Gen. Laws § 5-8-19 (1976) (engineers and land
surveyors).
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ported by substantial evidence in the record considered as a whole. 22
This standard of judicial review, however, does not adequately ensure
fairness. There can be "substantial evidence" to support a determina-
tion and yet that determination can be erroneous. This is particularly
true if the determination depends on questions of credibility. Al-
though disciplinary statutes provide numerous procedural protections
for both government employees and professionals, the structure of the
process often fails to guarantee an impartial decision-maker.
II. PREJUDGMENT AND THE COURTS
The Supreme Court has addressed the problem of prejudgment in a
number of instances, 23 most recently in Withrow v. Larkin.24 In
Larkin, a doctor sought to enjoin a disciplinary hearing to be con-
ducted by the same board that had investigated the charges against
him.25 The district court agreed that this would constitute a due
process violation and issued a restraining order.26 The Supreme Court
reversed, unanimously holding that the procedure suffered no consti-
tutional infirmity. 7
There was of course no dispute that due process demands an unbi-
ased tribunal. In fact, as the Court noted, "our system of law has
always endeavored to prevent even the probability of unfairness. "28
Nevertheless, the Court permitted the board to preside at the hearing,
stating:
The contention that the combination of investigative and adjudica-
tive functions necessarily creates an unconstitutional risk of bias in
administrative adjudication has a . .. difficult burden of persua-
sion to carry. It must overcome a presumption of honesty and
integrity in those serving as adjudicators; and it must convince
that, under a realistic appraisal of psychological tendencies and
human weakness, conferring investigative and adjudicative powers
on the same individuals poses such a risk of actual bias or prejudg-
22. See, e.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 32-1665(c) (1976) (nurses); Ky. Rev. Stat. §
325.360(10) (1983) (public accountants); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 119.12 (Page Supp.
1982) (all licensees).
23. E.g., Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 46-55 (1975) (license revocation);
Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 410 (1971) (social security benefits hearing); In
re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 137 (1955) (single person as judge and grand jury); FTC
v. Cement Inst., 333 U.S. 683, 700-03 (1948) (FTC antitrust proceeding).
24. 421 U.S. 35 (1975).
25. Id. at 39.
26. Larkin v. Withrow, 368 F. Supp. 796, 797 (E.D. Wis. 1973) (per curiam),
reo'd, 421 U.S. 35 (1975). According to the district court, "for the board temporarily
to suspend Dr. Larkin's license at its own contested hearing on charges evolving from
its own investigation would constitute a denial to him of his rights to procedural due
process." Id.
27. 421 U.S. at 55.
28. Id. at 47 (quoting In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955)).
1983]
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ment that the practice must be forbidden if the guarantee of due
process is to be adequately implemented.
2
In reaching this conclusion, the Court found support in a number of
its decisions. 30 Primary reliance was placed upon FTC v. Cement
Institute.3' In that case, Portland cement producers had been charged
with violating section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act 32 by
using a particular pricing system.3 3 Before conducting its hearing, the
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) had investigated the parties and
reported to both Congress and the President concerning the legality of
the pricing system. Some FTC members had disclosed that they be-
lieved the pricing system to be illegal. 34 As a result, one of the cement
companies, alleging bias, requested that an FTC Commissioner be
disqualified from conducting the hearing.35 The Court noted that a
judge would not be disqualified from deciding a particular case
merely because he had previously expressed an opinion regarding the
lawfulness of the type of conduct in question.36 It refused to disqualify
the Commissioner, stating that "the Federal Trade Commission can-
not possibly be under stronger constitutional compulsions in this re-
spect than a court. 37
Cement Institute was concerned primarily with a prior opinion on a
legal issue-the legality of a particular pricing system. Larkin, on the
other hand, addressed prejudgment of a factual issue-whether a
29. 421 U.S. at 47. In Larkin, the board had determined in its investigation that
"there is probable cause to believe that [the] licensee has violated the criminal
[statutes], and that there is probable cause for an action to revoke [his] license...
for engaging in unprofessional conduct." Id. at 41. One must ask whether someone
who has already decided that there is "probable cause" to believe that an individual
has committed a crime or engaged in other professional misconduct can in fact make
only the legal judgment of "probable cause" without also deciding the ultimate issue,
at least in some tentative way. The situation is similar to that which would arise if
the grand jury in a particular criminal case later became the trial jury, a situation
which the Supreme Court held unconstitutional in In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133,
137 (1955).
30. 421 U.S. at 47-50 (citing Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 410 (1971);
FTC v. Cement Inst., 333 U.S. 683, 701-03 (1948); NLRB v. Donnelly Garment Co.,
330 U.S. 219, 236-37 (1947)). Also see lower court cases cited in Larkin at 421 U.S. at
50 n.16.
31. 333 U.S. 683 (1948); see Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47-49 (1975).
32. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
33. 333 U.S. at 688.
34. The Supreme Court assumed that the Commission had adopted this view "as
a result of its prior official investigations." Id. at 700.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 702-03.
37. Id. at 703. Moreover, the Court pointed out that the cement companies had
participated in the hearings and "were free to point out to the Commission by
testimony, by cross-examination of witnesses, and by arguments, conditions of the
trade practices under attack which they thought kept these practices within the range
of legally permissible business activities." Id. at 701.
[Vol. 51
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professional licensee had engaged in prohibited conduct. The two
situations differ and require different treatment. 38
The Court in Larkin thought otherwise. It noted that judges often
make prior mental commitments even to given factual determina-
tions. For example, a judge may decide a motion for a preliminary
injunction and then preside over the injunction proceeding. 39 Simi-
larly, he may decide whether evidence is sufficient to hold a criminal
defendant for trial and then, if the trial is conducted without a jury,
make the ultimate finding of guilt or innocence. 40 Moreover, a judge
who is reversed on appeal may decide the same question on retrial.41
But the triers of fact in these cases, as in Cement Institute, are
individuals with some training in distinguishing degrees of proof in
making factual and legal determinations. This is not necessarily the
case with licensing and disciplinary boards. Furthermore, a trial
judge is not typically involved in the investigation or prosecution
aspects of a case and all evidence is received within the confines of a
contested hearing. Both factors lessen somewhat the danger of pre-
judgment.
The Larkin Court also cited as support the First Circuit decision in
Pangburn v. CAB. 42 In Pangburn, the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB
or Board) had, pursuant to its statutory mandate to investigate air
accidents, determined that the "probable cause of this accident was
the failure of the pilot to properly plan and execute the approach to a
landing. ' 43 In a later proceeding on a different record, the Board
reviewed a factual determination by the Federal Aviation Administra-
tion (FAA) trial examiner and his recommendation that the pilot
involved in the accident should be suspended for ninety days. The
pilot claimed a denial of procedural due process because the CAB was
not impartial, having already committed itself with respect to the
cause of the accident. 44 The court rejected this argument, stating that
"the mere fact that a tribunal. . . has taken a public position on the
facts, is [not] enough to place that tribunal under a constitutional
inhibition to pass upon the facts in a subsequent hearing. We believe
that more is required."'45
38. See Professor Davis' analysis based on the difference between legislative facts
and adjudicative facts. K. Davis I, supra note 3. at 248-49. See generally K. Davis,
Administrative Law, Cases-Text-Problems 265-78 (5th ed. 1973) [hereinafter
cited as K. Davis II].
39. 421 U.S. at 56.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 56-57. This was the situation in NLRB v. Donnelly Garment Co., 330
U.S. 219 (1947), which the Larkin Court cited in support of its holding. See 421 U.S.
at 49. In Donnelly, the Supreme Court had decided that an NLRB hearing examiner
who had found the company guilty of an unfair labor practice could preside over the
retrial of the same company. 330 U.S. at 236-37. The Court found no due process
violation. See id.
42. 311 F.2d 349 (1st Cir. 1962).
43. Id. at 356.
44. Id. at 351.
45. Id. at 358 (emphasis added).
1983]
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The constitutionality of the procedure in Pangburn, however, does
not diminish the unfairness of the procedure to which Dr. Larkin was
subjected. Moreover, the potential for unfairness of the Pangburn
procedure is not as compelling as that in Larkin. Pangburn was given
a de novo hearing before a separate agency-the FAA-in which the
trial examiner had made no prior judgments and the CAB's earlier
findings were not introduced into evidence. Thus, the investigator-
prosecutor-adjudicator scheme, which remained intact in Larkin, was
interrupted in Pangburn by the involvement of an outside agency.
Perhaps more importantly, the identical finding by a separate agency
lends credence to the CAB's assertion that the decision rested solely on
the record without its being "bound by findings made in an earlier...
proceeding. ' 46 Of course, Pangburn would have posed a far more
difficult question if the CAB had rejected an FAA finding in favor of
the pilot.
More closely analogous to the facts in Larkin, and more persuasive
in its analysis, is the Sixth Circuit decision in American Cyanamid Co.
v. FTC.47 Surprisingly, however, the Larkin Court distinguished that
case. 48 In American Cyanamid, an FTC hearing examiner concluded
that several drug companies had not engaged in unfair methods of
competition in their production and sale of tetracycline. 4 On appeal,
the FTC reversed this decision. 50 Prior to the FTC's decision, the drug
companies had moved to disqualify FTC Chairman Dixon from par-
ticipating in the proceeding, basing their motions on his earlier activi-
ties as counsel to the Antitrust and Monopoly Subcommittee of the
Senate Judiciary Committee. 51 That subcommittee had conducted an
investigation and public hearings into pricing and other practices of
the ethical drug industry in 1959 and 1960, and examined the manu-
facture and sale of tetracycline.52 The public hearings concerned sev-
eral issues involved in the FTC proceeding in question.
The court noted that Commissioner Dixon had "personally super-
vised all the investigatory activities" of the subcommittee staff53 and
had participated in the selection of witnesses and documents and had
"conducted extensive examinations of witnesses in connection with
factual issues involved in the present appeals. ' 54 On the basis of
Dixon's questions and comments, the court concluded that he had
"formed an opinion" that tetracycline prices were artificially high and
46. Id. at 356.
47. 363 F.2d 757 (6th Cir. 1966).
48. 421 U.S. at 50 n.16.
49. 363 F.2d at 762.
50. In re American Cyanamid Co., 63 F.T.C. 1747 (1963), vacated, 363 F.2d
757 (6th Cir. 1966), modified, 72 F.T.C. 623 (1967).
51. 363 F.2d at 766.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 765.
54. Id.
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collusive and that the patent interference settlement between Pfizer
and Cyanamid was improper.5 5 Those facts were "inseparably a part
of the ultimate findings of fact of the [FTC] in disagreeing with the
decision of the trial examiner." 56 Given these and other circum-
stances, the court concluded that Dixon's participation resulted in a
denial of due process, requiring it to vacate the FTC decision.57
Like the proceeding in American Cyanamid, a disciplinary pro-
ceeding in which the investigator later serves as the trier of fact
increases the likelihood of prejudgment on a critical issue. The com-
mingling of investigatory and adjudicatory functions, atypical as it
was in the tetracycline situation, is a daily occurrence in disciplinary
proceedings.58 The Supreme Court in Larkin, however, concluded
that the Constitution tolerates such commingling. 9 Entirely apart
from any specific constitutional infirmities, the question remains
whether the basic unfairness of the procedure counsels against its
use.
6 0
III. LEGISLATIVE RESPONSES
A. Inefficient Alternatives
Some states, in their efforts to ensure fairness in the disciplinary
process, mandate layers of investigatory, adjudicatory and appellate
procedures."' Though their concern for fairness is laudable, these
disciplinary procedures are cumbersome and costly.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 767-68. The court was careful to limit the potential scope of its
decision:
Our decision on this issue goes no further than to hold that disqualification
is required when, as in the present case, the legislative committee investiga-
tion involved the same facts and issues concerning the same parties named
as respondents before the administrative agency, and to the extent here
presented. We do not hold that the service of Mr. Dixon as counsel for the
subcommittee, standing alone, necessarily would require disqualification.
Our decision is based upon the depth of the investigation and the questions
and comments by Mr. Dixon as counsel.
Id. at 768.
58. See supra note 16.
59. Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 58 (1975). See supra notes 23-45.
60. There are dangers in allowing an individual who has investigated misconduct
and determined that there is probable cause to suspend a professional's license to sit
as a trier of fact in a later de novo hearing. The state board that is responsible for
professional discipline may view its role as more of a prosecutor than as a disinter-
ested finder of fact. A board of education may find it difficult to be unbiased when
the chief executive of the school district has already recommended dismissal of a
tenured teacher. And the danger of bias undoubtedly increases when an individual
actually conducts an investigation (as opposed to passing upon another's work) and
then sits as the trier of fact to hear and pass upon the credibility of witnesses.
61. E.g., N.Y. Educ. Law § 6510 (McKinney Supp. 1982-1983); R.I. Gen. Laws
§§ 16-13-4, -39-2 (1981); id. § 16-60-6(9)(h) (Supp. 1982).
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The New York professional license revocation statute6 2 provides an
excellent example of an altogether too cumbersome process. The stat-
ute requires the state education department to investigate complaints
against professionals and to refer "the results" to a professional con-
duct officer.6 3 If, after consultation with a professional member of the
applicable state board, that officer determines that substantial evi-
dence indicates professional misconduct, he may proceed with a con-
tested hearing.64 A hearing panel, consisting of five or more members
of the state board for the particular profession, 65 then issues a written
report containing a "determination" of guilty or not guilty on each
charge, "findings of fact," and a recommendation as to the penalty.66
A three-member regents review committee, before which the licensee
or his counsel may appear,6 7 reviews the panel transcript and report
and transmits "a written report of its review to the board of re-
gents." 68
The board of regents, after considering the transcript and the re-
ports of the hearing panel and its review committee, decides whether
the licensee is guilty or not guilty of each charge. If the board decides
that the licensee is guilty of any charge, it also decides the penalties to
be imposed. 69 If the board disagrees with the hearing panel's determi-
nation of not guilty on any charge, it may not substitute its judgment
for that of the panel, but rather must remand the matter to the panel
for reconsideration or a new hearing. 70 If the panel on reconsideration
makes a second not guilty determination, that decision is final.7 1
Decisions of the board of regents are reviewable in the Appellate
Division, which must sustain the board's factual determinations if
they are supported by substantial evidence. The Appellate Division
decision may be reviewed by the Court of Appeals.
The New York statute avoids the danger of prejudgment by empow-
ering the professional conduct officer to decide whether to proceed to
62. N.Y. Educ. Law § 6510 (McKinney Supp. 1982-1983).
63. Id. § 6510(1)(b).
64. Id.
65. Id. § 6510(3)(b).
66. Id. § 6510(3)(d).
67. Id. § 6510(4)(a)-(b).
68. Id. § 6510(4)(b). The statute does not specifically set out the function of the
report, but it is clear that its purpose is to assist the board of regents to reach a final
determination on the matter. See id. § 6510(4)(c).
69. Id. All decisions require "the affirmative vote of a majority of the members of
the board." Id. Thus, if several members are absent, it is possible that the board
would be unable to act because a majority of its members could not agree on a
particular decision.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. § 6510(5); Holmstrand v. Board of Regents, 71 A.D.2d 725, 726, 419
N.Y.S.2d 223, 226 (1979).
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a hearing. Although that officer must consult with one "professional
member of the applicable state board" before deciding whether to
proceed, the decision itself does not always require the board mem-
ber's concurrence. 73 Moreover, the State Administrative Procedure
Act 74 forbids the board member with whom the professional conduct
officer consults from sitting on the hearing panel in that particular
disciplinary proceeding. 75
The structure that the New York statute mandates achieves the goal
of fairness to the accused, but its cumbersome nature is unnecessary.
The initial hearing occurs before a panel of at least five people. That
panel's recommendations are reviewed by a three-person regents re-
view committee. That committee reports to the fifteen-member board
of regents which makes the actual determination of guilt or inno-
cence. Two judicial appeals may follow. While prejudgment is
avoided and fairness is achieved, the procedure is so difficult and
costly that disciplinary authorities may fail to take action in appropri-
ate cases. 76
73. N.Y. Educ. Law § 6510(1)(b) (McKinney Supp. 1982-1983). If the complaint
involves a question of professional expertise, however, the officer may seek, and if so,
shall obtain the concurrence of at least two members of the applicable board. Id.
74. N.Y. A.P.A. §§ 100-501 (McKinney 1982).
75. See id. § 307(2).
76. The Rhode Island education statute, R.I. Gen. Laws tit. 16 (1981 & Supp.
1982), provides another example of a cumbersome procedure. That statute empowers
the local board of education to dismiss a tenured teacher for cause. Id. §§ 16-13-3
to -4 (1981). The decision of the local board may be appealed to the commissioner of
elementary and secondary education, who has the right to make a de novo determi-
nation. Id. § 16-39-2; id. § 16-60-6(9)(h) (Supp. 1982). This broad scope of review
and the commissioner's obligation to conduct a hearing is a significant protection
against arbitrary or unfair action. See Schiavulli v. Aubin, 504 F. Supp. 483, 487-88
n.4 (D.R.I. 1980). The commissioner's decision is appealable to the board of regents,
which determines whether it was arbitrary. Altman v. School Comm., 115 R.I. 399,
347 A.2d 37 (1975) (interprets R.I. Gen. Laws § 16-39-3 to limit review to whether
decision was unfair, discriminatory or arbitrary). The statute grants the teacher a
further right of appeal to the superior court, R.I. Gen. Laws § 16-13-4 (1981), and
that judgment is reviewable by the Rhode Island Supreme Court. Schiavulli v.
Aubin, 504 F. Supp. 483, 487 n.3 (D.R.I. 1980); Davis v. Rhode Island Bd. of
Regents for Educ., 399 A.2d 1247, 1249 (R.I. 1979).
The Rhode Island procedure is unnecessarily cumbersome. If the local board of
education is able to make an impartial decision, there is little reason to provide for a
later de novo hearing and three layers of appeal. If the local board's finding is
suspect, it seems inefficient to have it conduct the initial hearing. It would be far
more efficient for the local board, on the basis of whatever investigation it deemed
appropriate, to decide that its employee should be disciplined and then prove its
charges before an impartial decision-maker. Moreover, in those cases in which man-
agement personnel have erred, it would save the board from the uncomfortable
situation of having to decide to go forward with a case and then (on the basis of the
employee's evidence) to determine that its own managerial personnel were wrong.
Additionally, the seemingly endless appeals that are built into the structure have the
net effect of delaying the process and making it so costly that management might not
proceed in some cases that in fact warrant action.
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B. The Federal Administrative Procedure Act
A better solution to the unfairness present in many state statutes is
found in the federal APA. 77 The APA recognizes the danger of pre-
judgment inherent in the practice of assigning to one person or agency
the duties of investigator, prosecutor and judge. Accordingly, it man-
dates an internal separation of functions to ensure that the investiga-
tive and prosecutorial functions are performed by persons other than
those responsible for adjudicating.78
In contested hearings to which the APA applies, an administrative
law judge (ALJ) may serve as the presiding officer. 79 He rules on offers
of proof and evidentiary questions, ° regulates the course of the hear-
ing,"' makes determinations with respect to depositions82 and subpoe-
nas, 8 3 and disposes of procedural requests.84 In short, he helps to shape
the record upon which the case will be decided. In performing these
functions, the ALJ need not remain passive; he may take an active role
in examining witnesses to obtain relevant facts and to test credibil-
ity. 85 In addition, the ALJ typically makes the initial or recommended
decision "unless the agency requires ... the entire record to be certi-
fied to it for decision."8 6
Although the ALJ is an employee of a specific agency, several APA
provisions seek to insulate him from agency pressure. 87 Within the
77. Government Organizations and Employees Act, Pub. L. 89-554, 80 Stat. 378
(1966) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.).
78. 5 U.S.C. § 554(d) (1976). Because the typical federal agency has many
employees, the performance of these inconsistent functions can be internally sepa-
rated.
79. Id. § 556(b)(3) (Supp. V 1981). This provision also permits agency members
to preside over the initial hearing, id. § 556(b)(2) (1976 & Supp. V 1981), but this
seldom occurs.
80. Id. § 556(c)(3) (1976).
81. Id. § 556(c)(5).
82. Id. § 556(c)(4).
83. Id. § 556(c)(2).
84. Id. § 556(c)(7).
85. See K. Davis I, supra note 3, § 10.03, at 221.
86. 5 U.S.C. § 557(b) (1976).
87. Section 11 grants job security by providing that an administrative law judge
may be fired "by the agency in which [he] is employed only for good cause estab-
lished and determined by the Merit Systems Protection Board on the record after
opportunity for hearing before the Board." 5 U.S.C. § 7521 (Supp. V 1981); 5 C.F.R.
§ 930.214(a) (1982). The Act also provides that his pay shall be "prescribed by the
Office of Personnel Management [(OPM)] independently of agency recommendations
or ratings." 5 U.S.C. § 5372 (Supp. V 1981) (emphasis added). The OPM has
established various salary classifications for administrative law judges. 5 C.F.R. §
930.210 (1982). Moreover, the OPM (and not the agency directly involved) decides
who is to be promoted in the event the agency desires to fill a vacancy through
promotion. Id. §§ 930.204, .206. While chances for promotion are undoubtedly
affected by prior work experience, OPM regulations provide that "[i]nsofar as practi-
cable, an agency shall assign its administrative law judges in rotation to cases." Id. §
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agency itself, the ALJ may not be made answerable to any agent or
employee performing any investigative or prosecutorial functions for
that agency. 8 In addition, section 589 of the Act prohibits agents or
employees investigating or prosecuting a particular case from advising
or otherwise participating in the decision of that case, or a factually
similar case.90 Finally, to eliminate the danger that a decision will be
made on the basis of ex parte information, the ALJ may not "consult a
930.212. For examples of earlier regulations, see Ramspeck v. Federal Trial Exam-
iners Conf., 345 U.S. 128 (1953).
88. 5 U.S.C. § 554(d)(2) (1976).
89. Id. § 554.
90. Id. § 554(d). Courts have been quite liberal in both their interpretation and
application of § 5. For example, § 5 of the Act sets forth procedures to be followed "in
every case of adjudication required by statute to be determined on the record after
opportunity for an agency hearing." Id. § 554(a) (1976 & Supp. V 1981). In Wong
Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33 (1950), the Supreme Court was asked to decide
whether administrative hearings in deportation cases were subject to the require-
ments of § 5. Id. at 35-36. Although the statute authorizing deportation contained no
express hearing requirement, the Court pointed out that without such a hearing
"there would be no constitutional authority for deportation." Id. at 49. The Court
concluded that the "required by statute" language of § 5 exempts from that section's
application only those hearings that an agency has the option of conducting. Id. at
50. According to the Court, the limiting words exempt only "hearings of less than
statutory authority, not those of more than statutory authority." Id. This liberal
interpretation is similarly reflected in Amos Treat & Co. v. SEC, 306 F.2d 260 (D.C.
Cir. 1962). In that case, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) charged the
Amos Treat brokerage firm with willful violations of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 and suspended the effectiveness of a stock registration underwritten by the firm.
Id. at 261. At the time of the preliminary investigation underlying these charges,
Manuel F. Cohen headed the SEC division responsible for the initial investigation.
Id. at 262. By the time the preliminary investigation was concluded, Cohen had
become a Commissioner of the SEC. Id. Thus, he participated as an employee in the
initial investigation. Notably, the statutory language of § 5 did not compel the court's
conclusion. The subsection which contains the prohibitions relied upon by the court
also provides that "[t]his subsection does not apply.., to the agency or a member or
members of the body comprising the agency." 5 U.S.C. § 554(d) (1976). Neverthe-
less, the court concluded that this exemptive language was intended to permit a
Commissioner to participate in the decision to investigate and in the ultimate adjudi-
cation, but only if he has not participated in the actual investigation. 306 F.2d at
266. This minimizes the danger of ex parte communication and protects against the
possible inability of someone to judge a case that he both helped to shape and, as an
SEC member, participated in the decision to suspend the stock registration and
initiate formal charges. Id. After learning of Cohen's participation, Amos Treat
sought to compel discontinuance "by reason of Commissioner Cohen's unlawful
participation and the unlawful ex parte communications betveen the [SEC] and the
members of its staff engaged in the prosecution of the case." Id. at 263. The court of
appeals agreed with Amos Treat, noting the need to separate the prosecutorial and
decisional functions of an agency. Id. at 265. The court, finding § 5 of the APA
applicable to Cohen's activities as an employee, concluded that he could not "partici-
pate or advise in the decision" of the SEC. Id. at 266 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 1004(c)
(1976)). The prohibition of § 5, clearly applicable to Cohen when he served as an
employee, "followed him and attended when he became a member of the [SEC]."
306 F.2d at 266.
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person or party on a fact in issue, unless ... notice and [an] opportu-
nity ... to participate" is given to all parties. 9'
The ALJ's decision becomes the decision of the agency, unless one of
the parties appeals.92 In the event of review, the agency does not sit as
an appellate court reviewing a trial judge's decision. Rather, it has all
the powers it would have had if it were making the initial determina-
tion.9 3 Yet even in this de novo procedure, the ALJ's decision is by no
means insignificant. To the contrary, if the agency's decision is ap-
pealed to the courts, the ALJ's findings may be of considerable impor-
tance. Appellate courts generally apply the substantial evidence test 4
in reviewing factual determinations of administrative agencies, and in
such a review the initial decision of the hearing examiner is most
important, 95 especially when questions of demeanor and credibility
are involved.96
The procedures mandated by the APA, although superior to many
state statutes, do not achieve a complete separation of an agency's
investigative, prosecutorial and adjudicative functions. In the final
analysis, the decision to proceed against a specific company or indi-
vidual belongs to the same commissioners or board members who will
ultimately render a decision.
Congress has supplemented the APA's protections against prejudg-
ment for the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB). The problem
of prejudgment by NLRB members was overcome by completely
separating that agency's investigative and prosecutorial functions
from the Board itself.97 The NLRB's General Counsel, who is ap-
pointed by the President and is not responsible to the NLRB, is the
91. 5 U.S.C. § 554(d)(1) (1976). The parties include the person against whom the
agency is proceeding, those who may have been allowed to intervene and the agency
itself as represented by those who have tried the case on its behalf. There is an
exception "for the disposition of ex parte matters as authorized by law." Id. § 554(d).
92. Id. § 557(b).
93. Id.
94. Id. § 706(2)(E); Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 487-88
(1951).
95. Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 496 (1951). In Universal
Camera Corp. the Supreme Court noted:
The "substantial evidence" standard is not modified in any way when the
Board and its examiner disagree. We intend only to recognize that evidence
supporting a conclusion may be less substantial when an impartial, experi-
enced examiner who has observed the witnesses and lived with the case has
drawn conclusions different from the Board's than when he has reached the
same conclusion. The findings of the examiner are to be considered along
with the consistency and inherent probability of testimony. The significance
of his report, of course, depends largely on the importance of credibility in
the particular case.
Id.
96. See id.; NLRB v. James Thompson & Co., 208 F.2d 743, 745-46 (2d Cir.
1953).
97. See 29 U.S.C. § 153(d) (1976).
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agency's chief prosecutorial and investigative officer.98 As such, he or
his designee determines whether to prosecute alleged unfair labor
practices.29 The hearings are conducted by ALJs, and the NLRB
members make the ultimate decisions, but no one in the decision-
making process, including the NLRB itself, has any authority over the
investigation or prosecution of the case. 100
C. State Statutes
1. The Model State Administrative Procedure Act
A Model State Administrative Procedure Act (Model State Act) was
approved by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws in 1946101 and was revised in 1961.102 Due to the increase
in administrative functions and agencies since 1961, the Commission-
ers adopted an entirely new administrative procedure act in 1981 .103
Like the federal APA, the 1981 Model State Act specifically prohibits
ex parte communications 10 4 and mandates the separation of investiga-
tive, prosecutorial and adjudicative functions. 105 To date, however,
no state has adopted these provisions. Instead, many states have con-
tinued to pattern their administrative procedures after the 1961 Model
State Act.00
Although the 1961 Model State Act addresses the problem of pre-
judgment inherent in administrative agency decisions, it does not
mandate the separation of functions required by either the federal
APA or the 1981 Model State Act. Consequently it is not satisfactorily
effective in dealing with the prejudgment problem. Under the 1961
Model State Act, agencies are not required to utilize hearing officers to
make the initial decision, nor is there a prohibition against assigning
an employee or agency member to adjudicate a case after that person
has performed investigatory or prosecutorial functions. Agency em-
ployees who serve as hearing officers may be supervised by those
responsible for investigative or prosecutorial functions. Those supervi-
98. The Taft-Hartley amendments to the National Labor Relations Act specifi-
cally provide that the General Counsel "shall have final authority, on behalf of the
Board, in respect of the investigation of charges and issuance of complaints.., and
in respect of the prosecution of such complaints before the Board." Id.
99. Id.
100. See United Food & Commercial Workers Int'l Union v. NLRB, 675 F.2d 346,
352-53 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
101. Model State Administrative Procedure Act (1961), Commissioners' Prefatory
Note, 14 U.L.A. 359 (1980).
102. Id., Historical Note, 14 U.L.A. at 357.
103. Model State Administrative Procedure Act (1981), Commissioners' Prefatory
Note, 14 U.L.A. 58 (Supp. 1983).
104. Id. § 4-213, 14 U.L.A. at 116.
105. Id. § 4-214, 14 U.L.A. at 117-18.
106. See id., Commissioners' Prefatory Note, 14 U.L.A. at 55.
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sory officials may determine salary levels, advancement opportunities
and job tenure of the hearing officer. Moreover, the agency employee
who prosecutes a case on any given day may sit as an adjudicator in a
factually related case on another day.
The 1961 Model State Act does, however, achieve some minimal
separation between the fact finder and those engaged in prosecuting
or investigating a particular case. Section 13 107 limits ex parte com-
munications with those exercising decision-making functions. As in
the federal APA, a distinction is made between employees and mem-
bers of the agency.108 An adjudicatory employee, who may be super-
vised by prosecutorial or investigatory personnel, may not communi-
cate with any "person or party" regarding issues of fact in the case to
which he is assigned unless all parties are given an opportunity to
participate. 0 9 With respect to issues of law, the employee may not
communicate with "any party or his representative."" 0 Because the
agency will be a party in most cases, the critical question becomes
which agency employees qualify as representatives of the agency. If
all staff persons are considered representatives, the adjudicating em-
ployee must be completely insulated from the entire staff. If, on the
other hand, the term representative is construed too narrowly, com-
munication about questions of law would be permitted with all other
agency employees including the investigatory and prosecutorial per-
sonnel who had worked on the particular case. Several exceptions are
made for agency members. They may communicate with one another
and are entitled to the aid and advice of "personal assistants."'
107. Id. § 13 (1961), 14 U.L.A. 426 (1980).
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. Given the requirement that findings of fact must be based "exclusively on
the evidence and on matters officially noticed," id. § 9(g), 14 U.L.A. at 404. there is
certainly nothing improper in providing a staff for the agency member. If all agency
employees are representatives of a party, the exception would permit agency mem-
bers to have the assistance of a staff in deciding questions of law.
For a criticism of the 1961 Revised Model Act, see K. Davis II, supra note 38, at
581-89. With respect to § 13, Professor Davis wrote:
Section 13 goes much too far in denying to an agency the use of its
staff.... Agency members, presiding officers, and members of the agency's
staff should be allowed to communicate with each other, except that the Act
should forbid communications between those who are participating in the
decision of a contested case and staff members who in that case have
participated in investigating, prosecuting, or advocating.
In other respects, § 13 does not go far enough. It should not only forbid
insiders from improperly communicating with outsiders but it should also
forbid outsiders from improperly communicating with insiders. It must deal
with communications in both directions, not just in one direction. And to
protect against contamination of the judging function, something more than
communication must be dealt with; those who participate in the decision
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Presumably an assistant's aid and advice may encompass both issues of
fact and law.
The minimal separation of functions achieved by the 1961 Model
State Act is an insufficient safeguard against prejudgment. States that
have adopted the 1961 Model State Act should reevaluate their proce-
dures in light of the 1981 revision. By adopting the separation of
functions and ex parte communications provisions in the 1981 Model
State Act, states, like federal agencies, would provide greater protec-
tion against prejudgment. The ideal solution would be to follow the
lead of some states, which have enacted provisions that go further
than both the 1981 Model State Act and the federal APA in ensuring
fairness in disciplinary proceedings.
2. Other State Statutes
Several states have enacted statutes which, although somewhat
cumbersome, are fairer than either the federal APA or the 1981
Revised Model State Act in professional discipline cases. For example,
article 61 of the New York education statute11 2 sets out a detailed
procedure which a public employer must follow if it seeks to dismiss a
tenured employee. After charges against the teacher are filed with the
district clerk or secretary, the board of education must meet in execu-
tive session to determine whether probable cause exists for the
charges." 3 If the board makes such a finding and if the teacher does
not waive his rights, the commissioner of education schedules a hear-
ing before a three-member panel." 4 Both the board of education and
the teacher select a member. The third member is chosen by mutual
agreement of the first two panel members, or if they are unable to
agree, from lists supplied by the American Arbitration Association."15
The designation of such a hearing panel avoids the prejudgment
problem. The panel has no prior knowledge of the facts, and unlike
the board of education, it has made no preliminary finding that
probable cause exists for the disciplinary action. The panel's determi-
nation, which is binding on both the teacher and the board of educa-
tion, is appealable to either the commissioner of education or the
courts.
Under a New Jersey statute,"16 written charges against a teacher
must be filed with the secretary of the local board of education. If the
must not be subordinate to whose who participate in investigating, prose-
cuting, or advocating, except that agency members must have ultimate
responsibility for all functions.
Id. at 586-87.
112. N.Y. Educ. Law §§ 3001-3031 (McKinney 1981 & Supp. 1982).
113. Id. § 3020-a(2) (McKinney 1981).
114. Id. § 3020-a(2)-(3)(c).
115. Id. § 3020-a(3)(c).
116. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 18A:6-11 (West Supp. 1982).
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board believes that the charge and the supporting evidence warrant
dismissal of the teacher, it forwards the written charge to the commis-
sioner of education.117 The commissioner determines whether the
charge is sufficient to warrant dismissal; and if so, he conducts a
hearing." 8 An adverse decision by the commissioner is appealable to
the State Board of Education. " 9 That decision is reviewable in court
to determine whether "the findings made could reasonably have been
reached on sufficient credible evidence present in the record" as a
whole and whether the penalty imposed is arbitrary or constitutes an
abuse of discretion.12 0 This statute successfully separates the commis-
sioner's hearing and decision on the merits from the employing board's
prior investigation and determination to initiate charges.
California provides another example of a procedure which, al-
though optional, achieves fairness in professional discipline cases by
following the federal APA model. In California, the same board that
conducts the initial investigation may hear the case and render a
decision.' 2 ' The Government Code, however, allows the various pro-
fessional discipline boards to have a hearing officer preside and pre-
pare a proposed decision. 2 - The hearing officer is not an employee of
the agency, but rather is employed by the Office of Administrative
Hearings, which hires and maintains a staff specifically to conduct
such proceedings. 123 Thus, a mechanism exists whereby the hearing
takes place and the initial decision is made by someone who has had
no prior connection with the proceeding and has not reached any
tentative conclusions with respect to the merits. While the board may
ignore the proposed decision, 24 its very existence would undoubtedly
assist the professional in any appeal because it would be relevant on
the question of whether substantial evidence existed to support the
agency's decision. 25
CONCLUSION
Many state disciplinary statutes fail to ensure a sufficiently fair
hearing for the accused professional. Pursuant to such statutes, the
same board or persons who initially determine that there is sufficient
evidence to warrant a disciplinary hearing may ultimately decide
117. Id.
118. Id. § 18A:6-16 (West 1968).
119. Id. § 18A:6-27.
120. Mayflower Sec. Co. v. Bureau of Sec., 64 N.J. 85, 92, 312 A.2d 497, 501
(1973) (quoting Close v. Kordulak Bros., 44 N.J. 589, 599, 210 A.2d 753, 758 (1965)).
121. See Cal. Gov't Code §§ 11,512, 11,517 (West 1980).
122. Id. § 11,517.
123. Id. § 11,370.3.
124. Id. § 11,517(b), (c).
125. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
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whether the professional has in fact engaged in improper conduct.
Although the Supreme Court has determined that the procedures
embodied in these statutes are constitutional, one must question
whether states should be content in taking advantage of this holding.
Frequently, the person or persons who sit as the triers of fact are
required to perform prosecutorial and investigative functions, a prac-
tice that increases the likelihood of prejudgment. Additionally, the
adjudicator may receive alleged facts about a case outside the frame-
work of a contested hearing. In the case of a disciplinary action
against a professional employee, the procedure may also place the
trier of fact in the position of deciding between the credibility of the
employee and the veracity of a supervisor, or another with whom the
adjudicator has a close professional relationship.
While no single solution guarantees an impartial trier of fact, sev-
eral statutory models have made great strides toward that goal. Some
statutes, however, although reducing the likelihood of prejudgment,
do so at the cost of efficiency. These statutes are not a satisfactory
solution to the prejudgment problem. The cumbersome nature of
their procedures may deter an agency from initiating disciplinary
action even though such action would serve the public welfare. If the
initial trier of fact is impartial, the necessity or advisability of numer-
ous administrative and judicial appeals is questionable.
The National Labor Relations Act and state statutes in New York,
New Jersey and California efficiently avoid the problem of prejudg-
ment and protect the professional against unfairness. The federal APA
and the 1981 Revised Model State Administrative Procedure Act,
while not completely eliminating the problem, are far superior to
most existing state statutes.
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